This paper treats the Sino-Indian border as a complex issue of interstate agreements,where preferences and characteristics of the national strategic culture of one state influence the moral hazard-related behavior of another,affecting the intensity and frequency of border conflicts.Using the Doklam standoff and Galwan Valley conflict as case studies,this paper explores the link between China's cooperative strategic culture and India's moral hazard-related behaviors.The paper argues,assuming other factors are constant,that the preferences of China's cooperative strategic culture inadvertently created a protective incentive mechanism for India's risk-taking behaviors at the border,thereby laying the groundwork for future tensions.To address this,the paper recommends that China revise and improve relevant agreements to enhance deterrence and reduce and effectively prevent moral hazard-related behavior of other countries.

As one of the world's emerging economies,India has seen rapid economic and social development over the past two decades.The expanding middle class,a key achievement and the important voter base of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP),reflects these changes.However,the BJP's growing welfare policies increasingly diverge from the pro-market and equity-focused demands of this group,a trend mirrored by other mainstream parties' shift towards welfare populism.This paper examines the political impact of the BJP's newly defined “neo-middle class”.It traces the evolution of the middle class in the Indian context and employs a loss aversion framework to analyze the challenges the BJP faces in expanding its political influence and the adjustments made under the Modi government. The paper argues that the concept of the middle class has broadened through political discourse,leading to public misconceptions.The neo-middle class,encompassing a large segment of those recently lifted out of poverty,exhibits weak risk resilience and heightened loss aversion,making them more sensitive to electoral mobilization and welfare policies.If India's pro-business development fails to benefit these lower strata,the current welfare expansion will become unsustainable,threatening long-term social stability and economic prosperity.

In line with its rising status as a global power,India's academic and policy circles have been exploring new paradigms to capture significant changes in its foreign policy.“Multi-alignment” has gradually emerged as a key term,seemingly a rejection of the long-held non-alignment principle.However,this paper argues that multi-alignment is not a departure from non-alignment,still less a rejection of it.Non-alignment is neither an ideology nor is it synonymous with Nehru's foreign policy;rather,it is a theoretical framework that transcends changes in the international status quo,and which is deeply rooted in India's strategic culture,reflecting its pursuit of strategic autonomy as a great power. Changes in the nature of India's foreign policy depend on both constant and variable factors.The basic constant factors include India's national security ideology centered around “Curzonism”,major power strategies,and great power strategic autonomy.The main variable factors involve the conflict between secularism and Hindu nationalism in Indian politics,major power relations,and significant adjustments in the foreign strategies of leading global powers.Understanding India's diplomatic evolution requires attention to both constant and variable elements.

Strategic competition between China and the U.S.has presented India with strategic benefits,which in turn have altered its perceptions of both strategic opportunities and threats.This has widened the gap between India's self-identity and expectations of its external role.Using role theory as an analytical framework,the paper explores how India's desire to play a global leadership role contrasts with the limited acceptance of such a role for India by core Indo-Pacific nations.Consequently,India attempts to reshape its role through selective identity switching and strategically highlighting its “Hindu characteristics”,while selectively adopting a “global leadership” role.However,frequent identity switching has caused confusion about India's role on the global stage.India's emphasis on its “Hindu characteristics” could reinforce the U.S.perception of India as an “emerging other”,thereby complicating the foundational basis for U.S.-India strategic cooperation vis-à-vis the “China threat”.The tension between India's self-perceptions and the role that it plays internationally will likely increase in the future.

India's geographic proximity to the Middle East and its long-standing interactions with the region make it a significant external player in Middle Eastern affairs.The Middle East is a key focus of India's foreign policy.Following the Modi government's ascension to power in 2014,India's foreign policy has become increasingly proactive,introducing the “Link West” policy and placing high emphasis on multifaceted cooperation with Middle Eastern nations.The “Link West” policy,aimed at boosting India's international influence in the Middle East,counterbalancing Pakistan's influence,and positioning India as a sustainable partner for Middle Eastern nations.Modi's approach employs tools like summit diplomacy,economic diplomacy,energy diplomacy,and public diplomacy to deepen cooperation with Middle Eastern countries.The implementation of the “Link West” policy by the Modi government exhibits distinct characteristics,emphasizing the construction of policy pivots,highlighting both economic and cultural policy approaches,and stressing great power equilibrium in policy execution.The policy has led to geopolitical shifts in the region,accelerating the fragmentation of the geopolitical landscape in the Middle East.At the same time,India is countering China in the Middle East through both bilateral and multilateral approaches,and future developments in the “Link West” policy deserve close attention.

Since 2011,Myanmar has fully leveraged its important geo-political position as a small state to shift its relations with major powers and neighboring countries vis-à-vis an evolving geo-political situation.After completing a conceptual articulation and comparison of hedging and balancing strategies,this article goes on to analyze Myanmar's policy choices in terms of balancing and hedging vis-à-vis China from 2011 to present along four dimensions:strategic objectives,strategic actions,behavioral trends and hedging intensity.It finds that balancing and hedging strategies alone do not fully explain Myanmar's policy towards China during this period.Influenced by factors such as great power competition,geopolitical dynamics,internal vulnerabilities,and a tradition of neutrality in diplomacy,subsequent Myanmar governments since 2011 have modified their policies toward China,displaying a cyclic oscillation between hedging and balancing strategies.During the Thein Sein and NLD government periods,Myanmar's policies towards China fluctuated significantly,with policy choices shifting between one of balancing under a dominant hedging strategy and hedging under a dominant balancing strategy.After the military took power in 2021,Myanmar's State Administrative Council faced a serious deterioration in its external relations,prompting it to opt for a dual strategy of hedging and balancing.